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Abstract: 
The timing of retirement among married couples is a complex process. As women remain attached to the labor 
market for longer periods of their lives and as they bring market resources such as pensions and health 
insurance to the couple’s retirement decision, they introduce new contingencies to the process and variability in 
job exits. Couples are most likely to coordinate their retirement timing to be as simultaneous as possible. 
However, the second most likely pattern is for husbands to precede their wives into retirement. This study used 
the Mature Women sample of the National Longitudinal Surveys between 1989 and 1997 to track the effects of 
family, pension, health insurance, and changes in spousal health statuses on joint and sequential retirement 
patterns. Proportional hazards models reveal that joint retirement is most likely among couples in which wives 
reach the ages of eligibility for Social Security and Medicare and among couples who have defined benefit 
plans. Alternatively, wives’ health insurance coverage from their own employment tends to result in their 
delayed retirements following their husbands’. Husbands’ health limitations and caregiving needs also delay 
their wives’ retirement, while wives’ health limitations are more likely to result in joint retirement. 
 
Article: 
The retirement transition in the United States is a contingent process that is undergoing significant change. 
While retirement continues to be a relatively universal experience, its timing and the economic and social 
conditions that underlie it are highly variable. Two sources of variability in the retirement transition are marital 
status at the time of the transition and the heterogeneity of working couples’ responses to each other’s 
circumstance as well as to their own market positions. Unmarried individuals are primarily responsive to their 
own employment, income, wealth, and health statuses. The behavior of retiring worker-couples, however, 
appears to be more complex. This study examines one cohort of retiring couples between 1989 and 1997—a 
period characterized by significant demographic and structural change with implications for retirement decision 
making. The problem is to distinguish the factors leading husbands and wives to retire as simultaneously as 
possible, to retire sequentially, or to remain at work. We draw upon family development theory to estimate the 
relative likelihood of these competing alternatives and their influences. 
 
Recent Trends and Contextual Factors 
At least two recent trends in U.S. retirement patterns underlie the growing interest in couples’ retirement 
behaviors. The first is the reversal of the trend toward early retirement (i.e., retirement before Social Security 
insurance eligibility ages) among women and men alike. Between 1960 and the mid-1980s, men’s labor force 
participation rates dropped significantly among those in the age range between fifty-five and seventy; but, 
beginning in the late 1980s and continuing to the present, the trend toward earlier retirement among men 
between fifty-five and seventy first leveled off, and then, among older groups, reversed (Quinn 1997; O’Rand 
and Henretta 1999). The labor force participation rates in 1990 and 1999, respectively, were 76.7 percent and 
75.4 percent for men aged fifty-five to sixty-one in those years; 46.5 percent and 46.9 per-cent for men aged 
sixty-two to sixty-four; 26 percent and 28.5 percent for men aged sixty-five to sixty-nine; and 10.7 percent and 
11.7 percent for men aged seventy or more. Among women—who have historically retired earlier be-cause of 
traditional work/family role histories—labor force participation rates between ages fifty-five and seventy and 
older have steadily increased between 1980 and 1999. The labor force participation rates of women in 1990 and 
1999, respectively, were 51.7 percent and 57.9 percent for women aged fifty-five to sixty-one; 30.7 percent and 
33.7 percent for women aged sixty-two to sixty-four; 17 percent and 18.4 percent for women aged sixty-five to 
sixty-nine; and 4.7 percent and 5.5 percent for women aged seventy or more (Federal Interagency Forum on 
Aging Related Statistics 2001: 68, Table 10). There is a notable increase observable among all age groups 
above sixty-two years, groups that were eligible for social retirement benefits (Social Security) beginning at age 
sixty-two, and elder health insurance (Medicare) beginning at sixty-five years. The reversal in women’s early 
retirement is more dramatic than that in men’s. 
 
Several demographic and structural changes probably contribute to the downturn in early retirement. The 
principal demographic factor is the general improvement in health and active life expectancy of the older 
population in the United States. Manton, Stallard, and Corder (1997) have traced these developments using the 
National Long-Term Care Survey and find that the older population is healthier and more vital than previously 
expected. This increase in disability-free life expectancy is most apparent in the community-dwelling 
population from their late fifties through their late sixties (Crimmins, Saito, and Ingegneri 1997). Thus, health 
limitations and disability as factors in retirement may be diminishing. 
 
Structural factors contributing to the shift away from early retirement include market-based changes in the 
temporal relationship between employers and workers. The market-based changes include economic 
restructuring and the decline in the so-called long-term employment contract (Levy 1998). Economic 
restructuring has increased rates of voluntary and involuntary job mobility and early retirement. Job mobility is 
taking the form of voluntary or involuntary movement from career jobs to ―bridge‖ jobs prior to retirement and 
returns to work after initial retirement (see Quinn 1999). The decline in the long-term employment contract is 
also evident in two other trends: in the expansion of contingent and nonstandard work arrangements in the 
United States and in the changing wage and employee benefits (occupational welfare) mix in worker 
compensation. The growing preference among employers for contingent labor has increased the share of part-
time and contract work offered workers, especially female and ethnic minority workers (Levy 1998). Though 
highly diverse, these groups are largely low-wage workers with limited employee benefits. 
 
The reconfiguration of the benefits mix for full-time workers to individualized private managed-care programs 
in health insurance and to individualized pension accounts (i.e., defined contribution as opposed to defined 
benefit plans) has shifted more responsibility and risk to the individual worker—and his/her family. The 
diversification of the employee benefits mix requires more and more workers to decide among an array of 
health coverage plans, that may or may not include other family members and that vary in their premium levels, 
co-payment rules, and level of access to care. Low-premium plans provide a minimal level of benefits (such as 
hospitalization for acute care only), limit insurance-covered access to a restricted list of plan-member health 
practitioners, and do not extend beyond retirement. Indeed, employer-provided post-retirement health insurance 
coverage declined between the late 1980s and mid-1990s; the proportion of retirees covered by employer 
provided health insurance between 1988 and 1995 declined from 44 percent to 34 percent (U.S. Department of 
Labor 1998). This trend may have motivated workers, in fear of job and health benefit loss, to stay, at work 
until Medicare eligibility at age sixty-five. Between 1993 and 1996, nearly one-fourth (22 percent) of the 
population aged forty-five to sixty-four was without health insurance for at least one month; in the same period 
the average number of months without health insurance coverage by the same age group was 5.5 (7.1 for those 
aged sixty-five and over) (Bennefield 1998a, 1998b). Job loss (including involuntary retirements) from 
restructuring or establishment closings contributed significantly to these trends. 
 
Retirement plans provided by employers also shifted to a greater proportion of employee stock options and/or 
equity and bond account alternatives and away from traditional defined benefit plans that guaranteed specific 
monthly benefits for life. While the new plans can be carried between jobs and can more readily be transferred 
to family members as bequests and gifts, their management requires financial skills exceeding most workers’ 
capabilities (O’Rand 2000). This shift also reflects a retreat by employers from occupational welfare costs. 
Individual retirement accounts and health insurance for current workers only free the employer of liability 
stemming from the longer life expectancies of former workers. 
 
Pension and health insurance coverage have been identified as important factors in the timing of retirement 
prior to full eligibility for Social Security and Medicare (at age sixty-five). Recent studies find that private 
health insurance coverage modulates retirement transitions before Medicare eligibility in countervailing ways. 
On the one hand, pension eligibility and health insurance that provides post-retirement benefits increase the rate 
at which men retire earlier (see Blau and Gilleskie 1997). On the other hand, high out-of-pocket expenses even 
among health insurance holders can retain workers on the job, slow retirement, or propel retirees back into the 
labor force. Women’s retirement responses to both health and pension coverage appear to be more complex, 
depending upon a mix of factors that include spousal age differences, husband’s employment and health status, 
and family economic well-being (Johnson and Favreault 2001). 
 
Social Security income does not seriously stratify the older population be-cause of its progressive features. 
However, net worth—especially pension and nonresidential assets—does stratify the older population 
considerably. Pensions provide the most significant share of aggregate retirement assets converted to income 
across the largest segment of the retired population. Equity from home ownership is also more widely dispersed 
in the population, but not usually converted to retirement income. When home equity is excluded, the 
elderly are among the most highly unequal in wealth of all the U.S. population (Clark and Quinn 1999). 
Nonresidential family wealth is almost nonexistent in the bottom third of persons and couples over sixty-five, 
instead being highly concentrated in the top two wealth deciles that are themselves dominated by married 
couples as opposed to single persons. Black and Hispanic elderly households in the 1990s have median levels of 
nonresidential assets near zero (Smith 1997). 
 
In short, early full retirement among couples declined over the 1990s, reversing a three-decade trend in the 
other direction. The extension of active life expectancy, the changing structure of pension and health insurance 
plans for older workers and retirees, and the spread of workplace insecurity have introduced disincentives to 
retire early. 
 
The second trend influencing retirement timing is the increased rate at which women retire as pension-covered 
and health-insurance-covered workers themselves, instead of as dependent spouses. The population aged sixty-
five and older in the United States is comprised predominantly of two distinctive groups: married couples and 
single women. Across both groups, women’s relative economic independence in retirement has grown. Between 
1960 and 1999, women’s increased labor force attachment patterns are associated with: (1) the dramatically 
increased rate at which they became entitled to retiree Social Security benefits based on their own employment 
histories; (2) the steadily increasing rate at which they participated in employer-provided pensions that provide 
additional retirement income; and (3) the rate at which they carried their own employer-provided health 
insurance to protect themselves (and often their families) from health-related risks. The Social Security 
Administration (2000) reports that women’s Social Security entitlements as workers (as opposed to dependent 
spouses) have grown from two out of five women in 1960 to nearly two out of three women in 1999. Relatedly, 
women’s participation rates in pension plans are approaching or exceeding men’s in most industries, although 
the ratio of pension benefit dollar levels between women and men approximates the wage gap prior to 
retirement. O’Rand and Henretta (1999: 23–27) report an occupational pension income gap of below .60 
(female to male pension income ratio), which is only slightly lower than the wage gap of .62 between women 
and men aged fifty-five to sixty-four. 
 
Women’s increased relative economic independence has, in all likelihood, influenced their retirement timing 
relative to that of their husbands. Women’s increased levels of early educational attainment over the post–
World War II period have led to longer work attachment patterns and higher relative earnings and benefits 
across succeeding cohorts (F. Blau 1998). However, the level of inequality among women in educational, 
occupational, and earnings/benefits attainment is relatively high and increasing (Mitchell, Levine, and Phillips 
1999). These inequalities constrain women’s general advantage in the market and their relative independence as 
spouses in the retirement decision. Lower market positions (service sector employment, part-time work, smaller 
firms, lack of pension or health insurance coverage) differentiate women into less advantaged groups. The two 
latter groups are pressured by countervailing constraints: on the one hand, the high ratio of pre-retirement 
earnings to Social Security benefit (due to the redistributive properties of Social Security) tends to induce earlier 
retirement, especially in the absence of private pension cover-age. On the other hand, lower ratios of family 
resources to needs require sustained labor force attachments by older women (Mitchell, Levine, and Phillips 
1999). 
 
Finally, the relationships among gender, family resources, and late-life health trajectories differentially 
constrain women’s retirement timing. Traditional family roles can affect the timing of women’s retirement. Old 
and new demands for family caregiving beyond the middle years have converged in tandem with the structural 
changes noted above. Families are smaller, but the longevity of parents and the extended years of dependency 
by children are squeezing late middle-aged couples’ financial and temporal resources. Older workers who are 
faced with limited health insurance options and sustained responsibility for children, grandchildren, siblings 
and/or parents alike are increasingly constrained in their retirement decisions by family-related demands 
(O’Rand, Henretta, and Krecker 1992). Husbands and wives face pressures to support spouses or other family 
members either by continuing to work or by exiting work to provide personal care. 
 
Lower economic status in association with higher levels of physical and mental health limitations can also delay 
retirement or provoke returns to work after retirement for some spouses (Mutchler, Burr, Massagli, and Pienta 
1999). Similarly, the severe decline in a spouse’s health (usually husband’s health first) constrains the partner to 
evaluate the relative costs of remaining in the workforce versus retiring to care for the spouse. In the latter 
context, eligibility for public or private health insurance with or without coverage of other family members or 
retirees strongly mediates the decision-making process (Blau and Gilleskie 1997). Able-bodied spouses may 
delay retirement in response to lost earnings by disabled spouses (Johnson and Favreault 2001) and to high out-
of-pocket health-care costs (like those associated with medications) not covered by private or public insurance 
(Landerman, Fillenbaum, Pieper, Maddox, Gold, and Guralnik 1998). 
 
In summary, major trends in the economic and family characteristics of older men and women are redirecting 
the attention of researchers to the dynamics of joint retirement for a growing portion of the older U.S. 
population—a portion that is relatively better off than single persons, but also highly heterogeneous 
along several dimensions, including income, retirement assets, and health. Women’s changing market and 
family roles add complexity to the retirement transition. The task ahead involves a reconsideration of how to 
model the family or household retirement decision. 
 
Spousal Bargaining or Joint-Role Investments 
The traditional economic model of retirement is predicated on the individual (usually male) worker who 
―chooses‖ between work and leisure at the end of the work career based on the expected present value of future 
utilities associated with retirement at specific ages. The key variables in this decision are prospective retirement 
income from Social Security, pensions and wealth reserves, and health. For spouses (wives), the assumption is 
that they derive their retirement status from the primary household earner/retiree (husbands) and either retire 
jointly or before their husbands. 
 
The trends outlined earlier are challenging these assumptions. Accordingly, alternative models are being 
presented by economists and sociologists. Economists are beginning to work with two different models. The 
―joint utility‖ or ―unitary‖ model assumes that married couples share resources and incorporate each other’s 
preferences in the decision to retire. As such, their relative employment opportunities and resources and their 
interdependent patterns of household consumption affect each other in a couple-based retirement decision 
(Lundberg 1999). The second, newer economic approach is attempting to model family decisions in ―game-
theoretic‖ terms that assume separate and noncooperative, as opposed to joint, interests of family members as 
factors in retirement. The latter approach has received little empirical attention. 
Empirical research on couples’ retirement repeatedly documents that they tend to retire together, that is, to retire 
as close in time to each other as possible following patterns of apparent cooperation or coordination (D. Blau 
1998; Henretta, O’Rand, and Chan 1993). These findings suggest that above and beyond self-interests, couples 
share ―preferences‖ that typically go unmeasured. Sociological models of retirement behavior offer some 
normative bases for joint retirement behavior that approach the measurement of ―preferences.‖ These models 
tend to consider the couple from a life-course perspective. Couples follow different work and marital careers 
that are distinguished by different pat-terns of investment in alternative family and market roles over the 
marriage. Joint-role investments in the labor market by couples, that is, similar patterns of attachment to work 
over the lifetime relative to attachments to family roles such as childbearing/rearing, should lead them: first, to 
prefer work over retirement and second, to prefer to remain at work or to retire at the same time. Couples in 
which both partners’ work careers entitled them to retirement incomes from their own employment histories 
will jointly respond to institutional retirement schedules (Social Security eligibility ages). 
 
Separate-role investments by couples in traditional marriages—which can include wives who never worked or 
wives who worked less extensively and continuously over the marriage or who carried higher childbearing/ 
rearing responsibilities—lead to other predictions. Wives who never worked, by definition, ―retire‖ with their 
husbands. Wives with truncated work histories, however, may or may not retire jointly depending upon their 
market resources. Wives with delayed entry into or interruption in full-time work are behind in pension vesting 
(or pension investing in the case of defined contribution plans) may follow their husbands (O’Rand and 
Henretta 1982). In addition, some studies have shown that women tend to be more invested in their jobs per se 
than men are, even though they may work fewer hours or earn less (Moen, Harris-Abbott, Lee, and Roehling 
1999). Accordingly, wives may delay their retirements to later than their husbands’ because of their attachments 
to their jobs as well as for family economic security. 
 
In addition, spouses do not necessarily maintain a constant division of labor between market and household 
work over the course of the marriage. Marriages (families) are variably changing relations of interdependence 
over time that influence the shifting division of market and family work among spouses. The interdependence 
of younger couples raising children is different from that found among empty nest and retirement-aged couples 
with one spouse disabled or less able (unable) to work. This shifting interdependence probably mediates the 
joint or sequential patterns of retirement in couples. Given adequate family resources, wives retire to care for 
their husbands and sometimes for other family members both inside and outside the household (O’Rand, 
Henretta, and Krecker 1992). Alternative, late-life family responsibilities (i.e., caregiving demands inside and 
outside the household) may discourage early or joint retirement for couples with financial responsibilities 
related to caregiving, and, therefore, encourage sequential retirement timing. 
 
Economic restructuring and the turbulent financial markets of the 1990s introduced new uncertainties for 
workers. Involuntary job mobility and labor exits increased across the occupational and industrial landscape and 
led to greater worker insecurity (Levy 1998). For some workers, particularly those who are younger, 
involuntary job change (or the fear of it) was not as ―fateful‖ and often brought opportunities to gain new skills 
(Elman and O’Rand 2002). For older workers, ―staying put‖ under conditions of economic uncertainty probably 
delayed retirement (Quinn 1999). 
 
In sum, the analysis of couples’ retirement behavior requires a conceptual framework that takes account of 
spouses’ career characteristics and their changing interdependencies. Also, it must take account of the 
environment within which couples make decisions with fateful implications. Thus, the integration of labor-
market and family-development theories suggests two major sets of hypotheses in the study of couples’ 
retirement behavior: 
 
Joint-Retirement Hypotheses: All else equal, couples will retire jointly (i.e., as close together in time as 
possible) when (1) they have the pension and health insurance resources to retire; and (2) one spouse requires 
caregiving from the other. 
Sequential-Retirement Hypotheses: All else equal, husbands will retire before their wives when (1) they 
experience health limitations; (2) they are significantly older than their wives; and (3) their wives earnings-
related resources are required by the household. 
 
All else equal, wives will retire before their husbands when (1) they experience health limitations; and (2) they 
provide caregiving to spouses. 
 
Data and Variables 
The data come from the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market Experience (NLS) of Mature Women 
(born between 1923 and 1937) who were initially interviewed in 1967 and have been followed periodically until 
1997. The NLS collects information on labor force status, job characteristics, education, work and family 
history on respondents and some information in these areas on their spouses. Between 1989 and 1997, the 
period over which these women can be observed in their retirement behaviors, more specific information was 
collected on health behaviors, benefit types, household assets, and caregiving in addition to detailed work 
histories. By 1989, nearly two-thirds of the original (1967) panel had been interviewed. For purposes of our 
examination, we selected all women who were working and married to workers in 1989, and who survive until 
the 1997 wave (excluding those who became widows over the observation period). Over the period, the NLS 
respondents were contacted four times: 1989, 1992, 1994, and 1997. This selection produced a sample size of 
474 couples. 
 
The distinctiveness and selectivity of this sample deserves special emphasis. These are Baby Boom cohort 
couples with wives who are relatively more attached to the labor force than is generally the case for earlier 
cohorts and for their own cohort. As such, with respect to work and career, they are probably more like younger 
cohorts of women today (Bianchi 1995); but, unlike younger cohorts, they had more children and interrupted 
their work careers more during childbearing years. Respondents selected for this analysis were initially 
employed and married in 1989; remained in the survey until 1997; and pro-vided complete information on the 
variables of interest. 
 
Variables 
The dependent variable is a polytomous outcome of competing risks that separates couples into four risk 
categories: 
 
Both remain at work in 1997: those couples who are both still working in 1997 (74, or 16 percent); 
 
Joint retirement: those who retire within twelve months of each other (157, or 33 percent); 
 
Husband first: husbands who retire twelve or more months before their wives retire (153, or 32 percent); 
 
Wife first: wives who retire twelve or more months before their husbands retire (90, or 19 percent). 
 
Three sources of information are used to determine whether a respondent or spouse is retired: wives’ self-
reported retirement exits, husbands’ retirement statuses, Social Security benefit receipt in observation years, and 
whether a respondent/spouse is sixty-five or older and out of the labor force, or repeatedly out of the labor 
force, after 1989. 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the independent variables (means and standard deviations for the 
continuous variables and percentages for the dichotomous variables) for the whole sample and by retirement 
pattern. The major variables include wife’s demographic characteristics in 1989 including her spouse’s age, 
wife’s work, pension and health insurance characteristics in 1989, and a set of variables measuring both 
spouses’ health characteristics, as well as nonresidential household wealth, and wife’s caregiving to spouse. 
Respondent’s age and the experiences of health limitations and spousal caregiving are time-varying covariates 
in the final models, while the other variables are fixed at the first observation period. Age is measured as time-
varying to capture the timing of eligibility for Social Security (beginning at age sixty-two for reduced benefits 
and at age sixty-five for full benefits) and for Medicare (beginning at age sixty-five). 
 
The pension variables come from respondents’ identifications of their primary pension plans as defined benefit 
(DB) (i.e., estimated monthly benefits based on specific formulas linking years of service and highest earnings 
levels for which they are eligible until death); defined contribution (DC) (i.e., money accumulated in accounts 
that can be taken as lump sums and/or as annuities upon retirement but whose duration throughout the retired 
years before death depends on individual investment, savings and consumption patterns); or both (Mixed) (i.e., 
usually defined benefit plans mixed with supplementary defined contribution plans). DB and Mixed plans will 
be combined in one category for the analyses because they are primarily defined benefit plans and offer greater 
certainty about post-retirement income than do the DC plans. In Table 1, it is evident that 46 percent of all 
women are covered by pension plans, with the majority (38 percent) covered by DB or mixed plans. 
 
The health insurance benefits variables come from respondents’ statements that their health insurance coverage 
(if they have it) extends into retirement and comes either from their own employment or from their spouses’ 
employment. In Table 1, it is evident that 39 percent of all women (couples) are covered by post-retirement 
health insurance, with women almost twice as likely as their spouses to have this coverage. These figures 
correlate well with the national rates of coverage reported by the U.S. Department of Labor (1998) reported 
earlier. 
 
Results 
The bivariate associations of specific retirement patterns with the major independent variables are consistent 
with expectations. Couples who remain at work between 1989 and 1997 are younger, closer in age to each 
other, and the most highly educated of the four groups. Importantly, wives in this group are more likely to be 
covered by DC plans than the other three groups and more than twice as likely as their husbands to be covered 
by post-retirement health insurance; both of these characteristics in the context of the 1990s appear to have been 
disincentives to retire. Finally, couples who continue working have significantly fewer nonresidential assets and 
fewer health limitations and needs for caregiving. 
 
Alternatively, joint retirees are the oldest, next closest in age to each other, and next most highly educated. 
Wife’s earnings are the highest on average in this group and their rate of coverage by DB plans, which are more 
highly associated with earlier retirement, is the highest at 43 percent. Health insurance coverage is lowest in this 
group of wives and thus does not operate as a strong disincentive to retire. Wives’ health limitations are also 
highest in this group. 
 
The sequential patterns, husband first and wife first, are associated most strongly with spousal age differences 
(husbands are 3.5 years older than their wives), wives’ higher coverage by health insurance when compared to 
their husbands, and husbands’ health limitations and greater caregiving needs. Wives who retire first are most 
differentiated by their higher rate of part-time employment, lower than average coverage by retirement health 
insurance, and higher average rate of health limitations. 
 
 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Couples’ Retirement Patterns 
The hazards analysis reported in Table 2 employs competing risks event history techniques, specifically 
proportional hazards models, to estimate the risks of joint and sequential retirement in a multivariate framework 
(Allison 1995). The general proportional hazards model is specified as: 
 
log hij(t) = αj(t) + βjxi(t), j = 1, ... , 4 
where xi(t) is a vector of covariates, some of which may be time-varying; βj indicates that the effects of 
covariates may differ for alternative retirement pat-terns. The a(t) function permits the hazard on time to vary 
across retirement type; the results of this component of the procedure will not be discussed here because of 
space limitations but are available from the authors on request. 
 
For each type of retirement j (joint, husband first, or wife first), we define a separate hazard function, which 
estimates the conditional probability that retirement will occur between t (1989) and t + At and the retirement is 
of a specific type (joint, husband first, or wife first) given that the person has not already retired by time t. As 
such, each separate function estimates rates of transition into a specific type of retirement and censors the 
alternative patterns. For example, the hazard function for joint retirement censors values for staying at work, 
husband retiring first and wife retiring first, and so on. The hazard coefficients are reported as hazard ratios. 
Ratios have values that range between 0 and greater than 1. Values below 1 represent negative effects; values 
above 1 represent positive effects. Values that approach 1 represent lower relative effects. Risk ratios can be 
interpreted as factor or percentage changes in the dependent variable for each unit or categorical change in the 
independent variable. 
 
Joint retirement, economic advantage, and wives’ health limitations.  
Table 2 reports results that strongly support the joint-retirement hypotheses. First, couples retire jointly in 
response to eligibility for Social Security benefits, which is evident in the highly significant effects of turning 
sixty-two and then turning sixty-five. Remember the joint-retirement couples are older, closer in age than the 
sequentially retiring couples, and include wives with defined benefit pensions that are typically tied to 
institutional schedules. Also, following the hypotheses drawn from the literature, wives’ health limitations 
increase their rates of retirement with their husbands after age sixty-two and even more rapidly after age sixty-
five when they are eligible for Medicare benefits. The only factor that slows joint-retirement patterns among 
wives is their coverage by health insurance from their own employment, which may reflect the absence of 
coverage of their husbands following retirement. 
 
Sequential retirement, economic need, and husbands’ health limitations. 
The sequential retirement hypotheses receive general support, but reveal complex patterns of couple 
interdependency. All else equal, husbands retire before their wives when they are older and require caregiving 
in the home and when their wives earn less than average but are attached to workplace positions that 
traditionally signal job security for them (i.e., union membership). In addition, wives are significantly less likely 
to retire first if they or their husbands are covered by health insurance and their husbands require caregiving in 
the home (see columns 1 and 3 of Table 2). While husbands’ health limitations can increase wives’ withdrawal 
from work, it is clear that wives respond with two opposite patterns depending on a complex (and largely 
unmeasured) set of contingencies. Husband’s health limitations and husband’s need for caregiving are different 
stimuli for wives’ retirement responses. 
 
The husband-first pattern is the second most likely pattern after joint retirement, a result found by other studies 
of retirement in the 1990s in the United States (e.g., Johnson and Favreault 2001; Moen et al. 1999). Wives 
remain at work after their husbands’ retirements for reasons of both economic need and job attachment, even 
when their husbands require caregiving in the house-hold. Traditional economic models of retirement cannot 
account for this pattern. 
 
The overall pattern of results suggests that the most income-advantaged couples retire together, while those with 
needs for earnings and/or health insurance coverage to handle caregiving needs (especially for the husband) 
may be discouraged from simultaneous exit from work. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The dynamics of couple retirement are complex. Traditional retirement patterns are changing as wives approach 
retirement with their own market resources and as the division of household labor is influenced by spousal 
caregiving in later life. Pension and health insurance are among the new resources that women bring to the 
retirement decision. Over the 1990s, these resources may have become disincentives for women to retire early 
or jointly with husbands. Traditional defined benefit pensions are highly associated with early retirement and 
encourage joint retirement patterns among women covered by these pensions. However, defined contribution 
plans, which comprise the type of pension that is more widely offered to younger cohorts of men and women, 
will probably not have the same effect. Downward fluctuations of retirement accounts during economic 
downturns generate considerable insecurity among older workers who fear that job exits will become 
irreversible and fateful transitions with uncertain long-term implications. 
 
The decline in employer-provided health insurance coverage of retirees is another trend that is introducing 
greater uncertainty for older workers about the future continuation and/or premium costs of coverage. This 
uncertainty creates disincentives to exit from jobs prior to Medicare coverage at age sixty-five, even when 
current coverage promises continuation into retirement. Out-of-pocket health expenses and the loss of earnings 
by retired husbands appear to discourage women from retiring ahead of, or jointly with, their husbands. 
The results emanating from studies of joint retirement over the 1990s will require the collection of more 
symmetrical data on spouses. The joint and separate interests of spouses have to be taken into account as 
simultaneously as possible. Databases must plan for the collection of equivalent information on both spouses’ 
current characteristics and retrospective work and family careers. This study is limited by the asymmetry of 
information on husbands and wives and the lack of enough specific data on the retirement decision-making 
process. 
 
Finally, comparisons of these patterns across countries and across economic cycles are long overdue. Theory 
development is not possible without strong comparison across space and time. U.S. patterns of retirement in the 
house-hold context are changing. Couples’ joint market work histories are influencing their individual and joint 
prospects for retirement timing. Concurrently, changes in the division of labor among married couples are 
different across countries and welfare regimes. Furthermore, the growing privatization of retirement savings 
regimes and health insurance systems is adding uncertainty to the household retirement decision process. Direct 
comparisons across social contexts are required to improve theories of retirement. 
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